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WATCHING THE WATCHERS: TASKFORCE ARGOS AND THE 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES INVOLVED WITH INFILTRATING 
DARK WEB CHILD EXPLOITATION NETWORKS 
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ABSTRACT 
 
As the kind of technology used by offenders advances, it has become increasingly necessary 
for global law enforcement agencies to adopt proactive strategies in order to effectively combat 
the threat posed by the organisation of child exploitation networks on the Dark Web. In spite 
of concerns regarding the collection of evidence, Queensland Police's Taskforce Argos has 
cultivated a reputation for success in the covert infiltration of online forums dedicated to child 
exploitation material due largely to the relatively loose restrictions placed on it which allow 
officers to commit a wide range of criminal acts whilst conducting controlled undercover 
operations. 
Key words: child exploitation material, child pornography, policing, law enforcement, 
jurisdiction, evidence. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Organised transnational criminal networks have proven to be one of the most significant 
beneficiaries of the digital age. An individual who may not otherwise have an opportunity to 
commit criminal offences is able to use the Internet to foster connections that normalise their 
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deviance and provide opportunities to commit actual, tangible transgressions. More often than 
not, these transgressions continue to take place in the digital realm in the form of consuming 
and sharing child pornography; on some occasions Dark Web forums can also facilitate 
transgression in the physical realm, by making connections between consumers and producers 
of exploitation material, providing an opportunity for consumers to transition into participation 
in the production of illicit material.  Given the constantly-evolving nature of the Internet, it has 
become increasingly incumbent on law enforcement agencies to develop innovative strategies 
to match those of their online adversaries. Difficulties for the investigation of organised crime 
networks have become even more pronounced with the migration of much of this criminal 
activity to the Dark Web, which is made up of a  series of interconnected peer-to-peer networks 
that are not indexed by conventional search engines or accessible by the ordinary Internet user. 
Forums and file sharing websites hosted on the Dark Web operate in a way that makes it 
challenging for police and Internet Service Providers to identify users, or to proactively 
shutdown websites that facilitate criminal activity (Broadhurst et al, 2014). By using web 
browsers that allow use of the Dark Web like Tor and Freenet to obscure their online activity, 
criminal users are afforded a sense of anonymity that allows them ease of access to a range of 
criminal networks facilitating illicit behaviours from drug trafficking to child exploitation 
material (Broadhurst et al, 2014).  
 
Amid the wide variety of illicit activities facilitated by the Dark Web, the distribution of child 
exploitation material stands apart as a matter of serious concern for law enforcement agencies. 
Not only does the Internet allow individuals to share pornographic material with only a few 
keystrokes, the establishment of deviant communities on the Dark Web has exponentially 
increased the risk for vulnerable children as demand rises for the supply of original child 
exploitation material (Oswell, 2006). To some degree, the increasing accessibility of Dark Web 
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platforms allows individuals to meet this supply with a sense of security, and the belief that 
their actions are imperceptible to law enforcement agencies concerned with stemming the flow 
of child exploitation material on the Internet. Before conducting arrests and prosecuting 
suspected offenders, it is necessary for policing organisations to first identify those involved in 
the clandestine online communities in which criminal activity takes place, and particularly 
those that are directly engaged in the abuse of children for the purposes of creating child 
exploitation material. As a means of obtaining the evidence required to support a successful 
prosecution of otherwise anonymous users on the Dark Web, police claim that it is essential to 
infiltrate online forums in an attempt to identify both abusers and victims; to do so, police argue 
that it is necessary to establish a controlled surveillance operation in which officers covertly 
act as administrators or moderators of illicit forums (Lusthaus, 2012). In Queensland, any 
operation that is conducted using undercover tactics and may require an officer to engage in 
illegal activity in the course of their investigation is heavily regulated and subject to 
considerable scrutiny. Described as ‘controlled operations’, investigations of this nature 
conducted by Taskforce Argos often require officers to participate in the distribution of child 
exploitation material in order to maintain cover and effectively entrap as many offenders as 
they possibly can. Although these actions are carried out with the goal of capturing sex 
offenders, police operations involving the dissemination of child exploitation material have 
attracted considerable controversy and the suggestion that officers took purposeful action that 
incited others to commit child abuse.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Even though global law enforcement agencies share the goal of investigating and prosecuting 
criminal offences, there are clear distinctions in the standards of practice expected of police 
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across different nations and socio-cultural systems. With the regulations governing police 
powers differing considerably between jurisdictions, it is useful to focus attention on a context 
in which law enforcement is granted a wide scope of authority in relation to covert infiltration. 
Whilst the vast majority of policing organisations are offered a certain degree of flexibility 
when it comes to covert intelligence-gathering operations, the Queensland Police Service’s 
Taskforce Argos was chosen as a focal point due to the expansive powers afforded to it under 
the state’s Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000. Under the provisions of this act, 
officers in Queensland have the authority to apply to the courts for permission to commit 
criminal offences in the course of an investigation. Officers in Queensland are empowered by 
a system that offers indemnity for a broad range of criminal offences; most pertinently for 
officers attached to Taskforce Argos, it is possible to petition the court to allow officers to 
disseminate child exploitation material in the course of a covert investigation (Hoydal et al, 
2017). Due to the relative lack of restriction on Taskforce Argos in comparison with its 
international counterparts, the Queensland child exploitation unit has become an integral 
participant in many multinational investigations conducted into the supply of child exploitation 
material on the Dark Web; its position at the centre of several major covert operations makes 
Taskforce Argos the perfect framework through which it is possible to understand the 
implications of using covert tactics when investigating potential criminal offences in a digital 
environment. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The vast majority of contemporary focus in the area of child exploitation focuses on the 
production and dissemination of illicit material over the Internet; that said, it is important to 
bear in the mind that methods of investigation child exploitation material predates the current 
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era of digitally-assisted offending. Shouvlin (1981, p. 535) notes that “the incidence of sexual 
exploitation of children [had] risen dramatically” during the 1970s. Shouvlin goes on to suggest 
that it is likely that this increase was simply a rise in reported cases, as opposed to an actual 
increase in offences taking place. Tyler and Stone (1985) support Shouvlin’s position that child 
sexual abuse has taken place throughout history, going further in arguing that technological 
advancement has simply provided more opportunities for offenders to exploit children in new 
ways through the production of child pornography. It was apparent to Tyler and Stone that 
child exploitation material could not be combatted without a global approach: they argue that, 
in spite of the fact that many jurisdictions had moved swiftly to prohibit production and 
possession of illicit material, the lack of a worldwide approach in 1985 meant that there would 
always be avenues by which producers and users could access exploitative content. Goldstein 
(1987) built on this early work in relation to child pornography with the publication of one of 
the first instructional manuals dealing with the investigation of child exploitation material. By 
incorporating insights gained by interviewing victims and offenders, as well as examining the 
legal and evidentiary concerns of child pornography investigations, Goldstein was able to 
produce a step-by-step guide for investigators that provided a standard of case management for 
law enforcement agencies prior to child exploitation offending moving into ever-more complex 
digital realm. 
 
Increased access to the Internet and the development of new communications technologies that 
accompanied this access has forced a significant paradigm shift in the way that investigators 
must approach the production and, particularly, the distribution of child sexual exploitation 
material. Ferraro and Casey (2005) note that undercover operations are often an important tool 
in gathering evidence against online networks without alerting participants that they are under 
active investigation; nevertheless, they also caution police not to ignore their ethical obligations 
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in the pursuit of a culprit. Ferraro and Casey refer to the ‘golden rules’ for investigating child 
exploitation online as established by Astrowsky and Kreston (2001), who assert that “it goes 
without saying that the job of law enforcement is not to add to the volume of illegal materials 
available on the Internet” by sharing child pornography whilst undercover (p. 1). Taskforce 
Argos investigators would dispute what is meant by ‘adding to” to the volume of illegal 
materials available to sexual predators of children, yet it is interesting to note that Astrowsky 
and Kreston are clear in their position opposing any and all dissemination of child pornography 
in the course of an undercover investigation.  
 
Wells et al (2007) highlight the difficulties inherent in conducting an undercover investigation 
into child sexual exploitation, even when using undercover or otherwise covert tactics; they 
argue that it simply not enough to charge an individual with possession of child pornography 
if a victim cannot be identified and proven to be unequivocally under the legal age of consent. 
In their recommendations, Wells et al note the “significant challenges” posed by investigating 
child exploitation material on the Internet and, again, call for a globally-coordinated approach 
towards online child exploitation groups of the kind that Taskforce Argos has become involved 
in with increasing regularity in recent years. Krone (2005) makes particular reference to the 
powers afforded to Taskforce Argos under the Sexual Offences (Protection of Children) 
Amendment Act 2003. Krone’s primary focus is on Taskforce Argos’s actions posing as 
children online in order to identify those ‘grooming’ children for sexual abuse; he notes that 
the phrasing of the amendment giving police the power to investigate grooming as a criminal 
offence is such that it allows them broadly extra-territorial jurisdiction. Under this amendment, 
Taskforce Argos holds jurisdiction if the offender or victim is “either in Queensland or 
elsewhere” and, as such, has a relatively open brief to investigate criminal activity with even 
the most tangential connection to the taskforce’s primary jurisdiction of Queensland. Krone’s 
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assessment of the powers afforded to the Queensland Police is relevant to the discussion of the 
factors that makes it such an integral global partner when it comes to investigating the 
proliferation of child exploitation material. 
 
In the global law enforcement community, Taskforce Argos has become a favoured 
international partner in the investigation of online child exploitation distribution due to the 
relatively lax restrictions placed on it by the judicial system. As such, the reasons that the 
methods employed by Taskforce Argos are not allowable in other jurisdictions must be 
examined in order to determine the ethical basis of the unit’s investigatory approach. A central 
concern is that evidence gained through illegal conduct could be deemed inadmissible due to 
the illicit way in which it was obtained. Erdely et al (2010) note that “at each step in an 
investigation, the investigator’s behaviour is bound by law… first and foremost, the 
investigator will be liable for lawbreaking of their own” (pp. 98-99); intelligence obtained as a 
result of illegal action is dubbed ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and typically results in a case 
being inextricably compromised. An investigation based on evidence that would otherwise fall 
under the category of fruit of the poisonous tree can proceed, however, if it is determined that 
an investigator acted in ‘good faith’ when engaging in the criminal behaviour that led to 
evidence being discovered (Fennelly, 1991).  
 
Good faith is predicated on the concept that invoking an exclusionary approach to blatant 
evidence of illegal conduct “serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises 
something incriminating has been found” (Fennelly, 1991, p. 1087). Use of covert undercover 
tactics in targeting child exploitation networks is a central area of dispute for those arguing in 
favour of a ‘good faith’ exception for criminal conduct by police. As Joh (2009, p. 157) states, 
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“the practice of authorised criminality is secret, unaccountable, and in conflict with some of 
the basic premises of democratic policing”; in contrast, Vendius (2015) argues that 
international experts are generally in agreement that “a proactive approach, including the use 
of undercover tactics, was regarded as crucial… [and] is especially valuable when trying to 
infiltrate paedophile circles where abuse is actually taking place” (p. 12). It is apparent that the 
type of undercover operations engaged in by Taskforce Argos exist in an ethical grey area in 
international policing literature: it is clear that engaging in criminal behaviour to gather 
evidence is ordinarily considered inappropriate, yet there is also a widespread agreement that 
these tactics work when it comes to infiltrating online child exploitation networks.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A background to Taskforce Argos and child protection in Queensland 
 
Established at the outset of the Internet era in the late 1990s, Task Force Argos was the first 
branch of the Queensland Police Service to address the challenges posed by the supply of child 
exploitation material via digital networks. Officers attached to Task Force Argos were engaged 
in undercover operations targeting potential child sex offenders in Internet chatrooms from at 
least 2002; posing as children in an effort to make contact and gather evidence against potential 
offenders, Task Force Argos was successful in identifying a number of repeat offenders that 
were actively engaged in abusive behaviours and were in possession of tens of thousands of 
illicit images of child sexual abuse (Krone, 2015). The type of network disrupted by these early 
undercover operations paled in comparison to those targeted by Task Force Argos in the mid-
2000s and, in particular, after its minor involvement in the multinational Operation Auxin in 
2004. After it was discovered by the FBI that a child pornography website was processing 
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credit card transactions through a Florida-based company, the payment records were used by 
law enforcement agencies worldwide to investigate and prosecute suspected offenders.  
 
Police arrested 191 individuals in Australia alone as a result of Operation Auxin, 57 of whom 
were in Taskforce Argos’s immediate jurisdiction of Queensland (Dixon, 2005). While police 
in Queensland were not actively involved in carrying out Operation Auxin, the potential 
presented by tracking those in possession of child sexual exploitation material was made clear 
by the coordinated action and would go on to become a staple aspect of Taskforce Argos’s 
strategy going forward. Taskforce Argos’s adoption of tactics building on those used in 
Operation Auxin was made clear through its involvement in Operation Achilles in 2006. A 
direct collaboration with the FBI, this covert investigation ran for over two years and focused 
on the infiltration of an international network of child sexual offenders; due to the 
comparatively loose restrictions on the actions taken by Taskforce Argos in its controlled 
operations, the Queensland-based unit took the lead in infiltrating the online abuse community 
and monitoring the material shared by its members, and was responsible for passing 
intelligence gathered to other partners in global law enforcement (Bowles, 2014). Operation 
Achilles led to the arrest of over 100 individuals for the possession of child exploitation 
material, the removal of more than 70 children from abusive situations and the closure of four 
commercial child exploitation websites (Munro-O’Brien, 2009).  
 
Infiltrating and controlling Dark Web abuse forums by Taskforce Argos 
 
Over more than a year, the multinational Operation Artemis focused on two interconnected 
child exploitation forums on the Dark Web: the Giftbox Exchange and Child’s Play. Taskforce 
Argos’s involvement with this investigation began in May 2016 after being offered access to 
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the account details of a European moderator of the Giftbox Exchange by a third-party law 
enforcement agency; this European agency sought out Taskforce Argos due to the stricter 
regulations placed on controlled operations in its own jurisdiction, as well as Taskforce Argos’s 
previous experience in Operation Rhodes (Bowles, 2014). As a moderator, officers from 
Taskforce Argos did not have full control of the Giftbox Exchange and could only monitor the 
activity of users on the site. It was during this phase of the operation that another forum, Child’s 
Play, was founded: officers monitoring the Giftbox Exchange suspected a connection with 
Child’s Play due to a range of similarities in messages posted by Giftbox Exchange moderator 
CuriousVendetta and Child’s Play founder WarHead (Hoydal et al, 2017). As it happened, 
these suspicions proved valid: both usernames could be traced to a Canadian man, Benjamin 
Faulkner, who was subsequently arrested along with Giftbox Exchange founder Patrick Falte 
in Montpelier, Virginia, on 1 October 2016 (Green, 2016). Faulkner and Falte had been tracked 
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and were arrested by American authorities 
shortly after having participated in the rape of a four-year-old girl; though both men were 
subsequently charged and sentenced to lengthy prison terms, U.S. law enforcement was able 
to extract the passwords for Child’s Play from Faulkner, which were then passed on to 
Taskforce Argos and allowed them to conduct an operation similar to that which took place in 
Operation Rhodes (Hoydal et al, 2017).  
 
Assuming Faulkner’s online persona of WarHead was a coup de grace of sorts for Taskforce 
Argos: whilst The Love Zone had a membership of around 45 000, the number of users on 
Child’s Play was significantly higher with around one million registered accounts at the time 
Taskforce Argos took control (McInnes, 2017). During the time that Taskforce Argos ran 
Child’s Play, the spread of child exploitation material on the forum was exponential. At the 
time that police took control of the site, less than 6000 posts with exploitative images had been 
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posted on the site; by the time Child’s Play was shut down eleven months later, this number 
had more than doubled to over 12 000 posts (Hoydal et al, 2017). Most concerning from a law 
enforcement perspective, while acting as WarHead it was expected that police would post a 
monthly status update which would include an image of child exploitation to ‘prove’ to 
members that the site had not been compromised; this activity would not be legal in many 
international jurisdictions, yet was an ability afforded to Taskforce Argos under the auspices 
of a “controlled operation” under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000. Paul 
Griffiths, one of Taskforce Argos’s lead investigators, told VG magazine that the images shared 
were already in circulation, and that it was the view of he and his colleagues that the benefits 
of re-sharing the images outweighed the negatives associated with perpetuating the 
dissemination of the material (Hoydal et al, 2017). Taskforce Argos operated Child’s Play as 
WarHead for eleven months before shutting down the forum and, based on the principle that it 
only shared exploitative material with WarHead’s monthly status update, it could be assumed 
that child abuse material was shared by officers on at least eleven separate occasions. The 
covert phase of Operation Artemis came to a conclusion on 13 September 2017 with the closure 
of Child’s Play: as a result of the undercover investigation, Taskforce Argos was able to 
identify up to 90 primary targets worldwide and over 900 users that it believed should be 
arrested for either producing or possessing child exploitation material (Hoydal et al, 2017).  
 
Protecting against evidentiary exclusion the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine in 
Queensland 
 
Regardless of the results achieved in Taskforce Argos’s covert operations, the methods adopted 
by Queensland police in order to infiltrate targeted networks of child sexual exploitation 
continue to prove controversial. It is evident that officers attached to Taskforce Argos have had 
the opportunity to develop a clear expertise in combating child pornography on the Dark Web; 
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that said, the initial partnerships forged between Taskforce Argos and its international 
counterparts resulted first and foremost as a by-product of the lax restrictions placed on 
controlled operations in Queensland (Bowles, 2014). Tactics that were essential to the success 
of investigations like Operation Rhodes and Operation Artemis would not have been legal in 
other jurisdictions, and as such the evidence gained by the use of these methods would be 
inadmissible in court. Unlawfully obtained evidence is often labelled as “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” in the law enforcement community, a reference to the fact that it is indelibly tarnished by 
the methods by which it was acquired (Erdely et al, 2010). Pitler argues that “there must be a 
significant relationship between the unlawful activity and the evidence seized to warrant 
exclusion” in a judicial setting (1968, p. 579). If the illegal actions of a police officer were a 
fundamental element in the acquisition of the evidence in question, Pitler asserts that a 
reasonable level of causation would exist to allow for it to be set aside by a trial judge. In the 
vast majority of cases, the processes governing evidence-gathering by police officers are fairly 
straight-forward, as would the definitions around what would constitute fruit of the poisonous 
tree; the legal indemnities associated with controlled operations by specialist units like 
Taskforce Argos serve to complicate these established protocols and, in the Queensland 
context, provides for an almost limitless set of exceptions that allow officers to act with virtual 
impunity.  
 
In analysing the extent to which Taskforce Argos’s investigative methods attract the risk of 
bearing fruit of the poisonous tree, it is important to differentiate between what is allowable 
under the provisions of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 and what is not. The 
act is explicit in delineating the powers afforded to Queensland police officers whilst engaged 
in a controlled operation. Authority is given to participants in a controlled operation under 
section 258 of this legislation to engage in a broad range of criminal conduct if they deem it 
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“reasonably necessary” to maintain their cover or to otherwise “take advantage of an 
opportunity to gather evidence about a relevant offence” (p. 303). Of particular note when 
considering the global-focus of Taskforce Argos is the broad scope in which the Police Powers 
and Responsibilities Act 2000 defines the jurisdiction of officers participating in controlled 
operations. The act establishes that indemnities are provided to those involved in a controlled 
operation “despite any other Act or law of this jurisdiction… whether in this jurisdiction or 
elsewhere” (p. 302). Establishing a form of extra-territorial jurisdiction is a key provision when 
it comes to the work performed by Taskforce Argos on Dark Web forums like Child’s Play, in 
a similar manner to the way that Krone (2005) argues that the Sexual Offences (Protection of 
Children) Amendment Act 2003 is a necessary legislative measure to enable the Queensland 
police to pursue those grooming children in online chatrooms. By providing a protection for 
extra-jurisdictional action each of these acts protect against a common source of evidentiary 
exclusion, that being occasions in which an operation is conducted outside of an agencies pre-
defined jurisdictional authority (Tullis & Ludlow, 1975). If not for these extensions in the 
parameters of police jurisdiction, it would be far more complicated for Taskforce Argos to 
obtain usable intelligence on the Dark Web. A forum like Child’s Play, with its American-
Canadian administrators and a server based in Europe, would be arguably off-limits to 
Taskforce Argos under ordinary circumstances; this would effectively curtail investigations 
like Operation Artemis before they even began and necessitate a complete overhaul in the 
strategies used by the Queensland police.  
 
There are several clauses in the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 that restrict the 
actions of officers like those serving in Taskforce Argos. Aside from ruling out immunity for 
criminal actions causing death or serious injury, the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 
2000 specifically precludes indemnity for conduct that “involve[s] the commission of a sexual 
14 
 
offence against any person” in the course of an investigation (p. 303). It is this clause that 
presents the most significant concern for Taskforce Argos when it comes to conducting long-
term covert investigations such as the administration of Child’s Play in 2016/17. Unlike 
previous controlled operations conducted by Taskforce Argos, it was required of officers 
posing as Child’s Play founder WarHead to post regular status updates featuring images of 
child pornography with some regularity over the eleven month period that Queensland police 
had control of the forum (Hoydal et al, 2017). From a judicial standpoint, it is fairly ambiguous 
as to whether posting images of child exploitation in itself constitutes incitement to commit an 
offence; what is more explicit, however, is the type of language that accompanied these images 
as part of WarHead’s monthly status update. VG reports that on 3 January 2017 - several 
months after Child’s Play was taken over by Taskforce Argos – an officer posing as WarHead 
posted a message to users reading “I hope that some of you were able to give a special present 
to the little ones in your lives, and spend some time with them” (Hoydal et al, 2017).  
 
In an interview with VG, senior officer Paul Griffiths admits that the use of such language could 
be interpreted as encouraging or inciting the commission of an offence against a child. 
Nevertheless, a legislative loophole exists in the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 
that could be used to avoid prosecution for offences of this nature: subsection 3(d) of section 
258 of the act states that an officer is considered criminally responsible if they encourage or 
induce a person to commit an offence “of a kind the person could not reasonably be expected 
to have engaged in if not encouraged or induced by the officer to engage in it” (p. 303). It could 
be argued that users of a Dark Web forum dedicated to child abuse like the members of Child’s 
Play are already predisposed to commit a sexual offence against children; as such, the 
ambiguous encouragement of an undercover officer could not be considered to induce them to 
commit a criminal act that they “could not reasonably be expected to have engaged in” absent 
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the intervention of undercover police officers. As in most circumstances, context is key in 
determining the extent of protection afforded to police in controlled operations like those 
carried out by Taskforce Argos. Due to the extensive nature of the protections in the Police 
Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, it is clear that evidence gathered by Taskforce Argos 
through investigations like Operation Artemis would not be considered fruit of the poisonous 
tree in cases presented before a court that acts under the judicial authority of Queensland.  
 
Cross-jurisdictional issues arising from Taskforce Argos’s methods 
 
Though the provisions of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 support the 
admissibility of evidence in Queensland, this is not to suggest that intelligence that is lawfully 
obtained by Taskforce Argos would be considered as fruit of the poisonous tree in other 
jurisdictions. Reidenberg (2005) notes that “the current Internet technology creates ambiguity 
for sovereign territory because network boundaries intersect and transcend national borders” 
(p. 1951); whereas Reidenberg sees this as a problem for global law enforcement, the 
collaborative partnerships that exist between Taskforce Argos and its international counterparts 
indicates that a lack of clearly-defined sovereignty has in fact proven beneficial in the pursuit 
of online child exploitation networks. Earlier investigations such as Operation Achilles and 
Operation Rhodes were predicated on a vague sense of jurisdictional authority in the sense that 
Taskforce Argos’s involvement was triggered by the reasonable belief that offenders were 
operating within Queensland’s borders (Munro-O’Brien, 2009; Safi, 2016). Whilst the field of 
digital law is constantly evolving, the concept of personal jurisdiction on the Internet was 
firmly established by the High Court of Australia in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick in 2002. It 
was determined by the court in this case that U.S. organisation Dow Jones were subject to 
Australian defamation law arising from posts published on one of its websites, in spite of the 
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fact that the post in question had been written in the U.S. and published on a U.S. based server 
(Garnett, 2004). As a result of this case, it was established under Australian law that the location 
in which the offence caused harm could be considered a ‘personal jurisdiction’ and it was just 
as possible to pursue legal action in that venue; the verdict in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick led 
to a more ambiguous re-definition of jurisdiction that is to the benefit of Taskforce Argos when 
it comes to justifying its involvement in high-profile multinational investigations.  
 
By the time Operation Artemis commenced in 2016, this pretext of legitimate jurisdictional 
authority as established by Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick had been all but abandoned in order to 
focus on identifying and shutting down criminal networks regardless of the location of 
offenders or victims. As noted, the ability to act across jurisdictional borders is given to 
Queensland police under the provisions governing controlled operations in the Police Powers 
and Responsibilities Act 2000; there is no condition in this act that officers must reasonably 
believe an offence is being committed or will be committed in Queensland, giving specialist 
teams like Taskforce Argos the authority to act outside of its jurisdiction in a loosely-defined 
range of situations. Providing its expertise to assist the investigations of international partner 
agencies is one of the circumstances in which extra-jurisdictional actions carried out by 
Taskforce Argos have been routinely approved by Queensland authorities, particularly in the 
period since the unit achieved global acclaim for its successes in Operation Achilles (Bowles, 
2014). A grey area does exist, nevertheless, in terms of whether investigations like Operation 
Rhodes and Operation Artemis should be considered a collaborative partnership or a case of 
jurisdictional forum shopping by international law enforcement agencies. It appears that there 
was little pretext for the involvement of Taskforce Argos in the initial investigation into the 
Giftbox Exchange and Child’s Play Dark Web forums. Indeed, officers from Taskforce Argos 
originally assumed the identity of a moderator on the Giftbox Exchange in May 2016 after 
17 
 
being supplied their log-in details by a European policing agency that had arrested them on 
charges entirely unrelated to offences being conducted in Queensland; in the same manner, the 
security details for Child’s Play supplied to U.S. law enforcement by Faulkner several months 
later were also supplied to Taskforce Argos with the explicit understanding that they would 
engage in a covert infiltration of the forum using Faulkner’s WarHead identity (Hoydal et al, 
2017).  
 
It is clear that this type of covert operation was not passed over to the Queensland police solely 
due to its much-touted expertise in the field: it appears that Taskforce Argos has been singled-
out for involvement in investigations of this nature largely due to the fact that it is legally able 
to engage in a broader range of illegal activity during controlled operations than is allowed in 
other jurisdictions. To this extent, it seems that the global partners of Taskforce Argos have 
engaged in a process of jurisdictional forum shopping in which the primary venue for a covert 
operation is purposefully selected in order to maximise the ability of investigating officers to 
use tactics that would otherwise be considered illegal in order to maintain cover and gather 
evidence against suspected offenders (Uchida et al, 1988). Out-sourcing such operations to 
partners like Taskforce Argos serves as a work-around of sorts, with international policing 
agencies benefiting from the looser restrictions placed on its partners by using evidence 
gathered by Taskforce Argos to build a case; had this evidence been obtained in the same 
manner by one of Taskforce Argos’s partners, it is likely that it would have been considered 
inadmissible as the methods used in the police investigation would be considered unlawful 
under the restrictions applied in the jurisdiction under which it ordinarily operates.  
 
Good faith provisions and the use of questionably-obtained evidence 
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In spite of the fact that intelligence gathered by Taskforce Argos by use of its covert tactics 
may be tarnished from the perspective of other jurisdictions, ‘good faith’ principles can be 
applied that allow for the evidence to be used by international partners. Whilst it is generally 
difficult to ascertain intent, it is an option available to the court to consider the motivations of 
a police officer’s actions in determining whether evidence obtained by questionable means can 
be considered admissible in a criminal trial (Uchida et al, 1988). In cases relying on the 
application of a good faith principle, a variation of the reasonable person test applies in which 
an officer must prove that “a reasonable officer possessing the same information as the 
arresting officer would believe his or her conduct was lawful” (Lopuszynski, 2004, p. 1360). 
An argument could be made that officers using evidence supplied by Taskforce Argos could 
be considered to act in good faith given that the tactics used to obtain the evidence were 
sanctioned under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the covert operation was carried out. Any 
intelligence passed on to partner agencies by Taskforce Argos was obtained in a lawful manner 
and, as such, officers using this information to build a case could argue that they are acting in 
trust with their international counterparts; it could also be argued that, no matter how this 
intelligence was obtained, the good faith principle requires an officer to act if the exclusion of 
such evidence “serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises something 
incriminating has been found” (Fennelly, 1991, p. 1087). If it is determined that not using the 
kind of intelligence supplied by Taskforce Argos would lead to a child being at increased of 
sexual abuse, a court may find that an officer acted in good faith that their actions were justified 
and allow for the inclusion of evidence that would be considered inadmissible in any other 
context.  
 
There is little doubt that a claim for acting in good faith could be applied in situations wherein 
police used the intelligence of international partners to successful bring charges against a child 
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sexual offender. It is reasonable to assume that, should a subsequent raid or surveillance 
produce further evidence of offending, a court would not question the means by which a law 
enforcement agency was originally able to identify a suspect. That said, the application of good 
faith becomes more ambiguous when it is considered in the context of cross-jurisdictional 
cooperation between Taskforce Argos and its international partners. As noted, good faith is 
typically predicated on an arresting officer’s genuine belief “that his or her conduct was lawful” 
(Lopuszynski, 2004, p. 1360); what remains in doubt is the specific definition of lawful, and 
under which jurisdictional authority lawfulness is determined. In the case of Operation 
Artemis, the log-in details of both Faulkner and an unidentified moderator of the Giftbox 
Exchange were supplied to Taskforce Argos by multiple international policing agencies with 
the clear understanding that the Queensland-based unit would conduct a covert infiltration 
using tactics that were not legally available to the agencies that were originally in receipt of the 
information (Hoydal et al, 2017).  
 
By the simple virtue of passing on this intelligence, it is evident that Taskforce Argos’s partner 
agencies were aware that the methods necessary to conduct an investigation like Operation 
Artemis would not be lawful in their own jurisdiction. Taken further, it could be assumed that 
any intelligence received from Taskforce Argos subsequent to the supply of log-in details could 
be assumed to have been obtained in a manner that - under their own legal system - was at best 
questionable, and at worst criminal. If police were to simply receive information obtained by 
Taskforce Argos without any prior involvement, it could certainly fall under the good faith 
principle; if that agency was actively involved in outsourcing an operation to Taskforce Argos 
with the understanding that it would likely use tactics considered illegal in its own jurisdiction, 
it is probable that officers from a partner agency were aware that the methods were unlawful 
and, as such, the good faith principle would be voided. It is clear that complications exist at the 
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intersection of international collaboration and good faith use of the evidence supplied by global 
partner agencies. A case could be made that policing agencies that hand off investigations to 
Taskforce Argos with the knowledge that it uses investigatory methods illegal in their own 
country with the intent of using intelligence obtained through these tactics could be considered 
to be engaged in conspiratorial behaviour that would invariably compromise its investigations 
and put the court in a position where it was forced to disregard the concept of good faith and 
rule evidence presented by police to be inadmissible (Lopuszynski, 2004, pp. 1369-1370). The 
ramifications of a ruling of this kind are significant, and potentially place an unquantifiable 
number of children at a greater level of risk by causing criminal trials against offenders to be 
thrown out of court.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that the work performed by Taskforce Argos has led to a considerable amount of 
child sexual offenders being brought to justice, and a number of websites dedicated to child 
sexual exploitation material being closed down. By this logic, it serves as a viable model for 
the investigation of child abuse networks by covert means in a way that achieves results. That 
said, it is problematic to base an assessment of Taskforce Argos solely on the results that it is 
able to achieve; doing so would be to take a utilitarian perspective in which the ends justifies 
the means and ethical considerations are abandoned in the pursuit of a goal (Skolnick, 1982). 
In many respects, the kind of cross-national investigations that Taskforce Argos participates in 
take place in a digital environment that is constantly evolving due to rapid advancements in the 
technology used to obscure the identities of offenders; as a result, there has been relatively little 
analysis or evaluation of Taskforce Argos’s clandestine tactics on the Dark Web. In particular, 
it is essential for further research to determine the extent to which the evidence obtained by 
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Taskforce Argos would be considered tarnished by the legal systems under which the global 
law enforcement partners of the Queensland Police operate. It is without question that the 
actions taken by Taskforce Argos are legal under the law governing controlled operations in 
Queensland. It is clearly outlined in the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 that 
Queensland police have broad powers to commit criminal acts that are deemed reasonably 
necessary in order to maintain cover and effectively conduct a covert investigation; whilst there 
are provisions precluding serious criminal acts, these terms are generally non-restrictive and 
are further qualified by additional clauses that govern the legal definition of what is considered 
as inciting a criminal act.  
 
While the covert activities of Taskforce Argos are protected in the Queensland legal system, it 
remains in doubt as to if this intelligence can be lawfully used in jurisdictions where such 
methods would be deemed unlawful. In cases in which a police investigation is tarnished by 
unlawful conduct, most jurisdictions apply some form of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
that would rule evidence gathered by illegal means as inadmissible in a criminal trial (Pitler, 
1968). While this research highlights a potential weakness in the use of this evidence by 
Taskforce Argos’s international partners, more specific efforts must be taken to contextualise 
this aspect of cross-national collaboration based on the rules of evidence in the respective 
countries in which prosecutions have been built on the basis of a Queensland Police 
investigation. It is the contention of this research that a cloud of ambiguity exists over the 
intelligence supplied by Taskforce Argos to its international partners in jurisdictions where the 
methods used by Queensland police would not be sanctioned; as such, a balance must be struck 
between the application of good faith principles in the use of this evidence, and a consideration 
of the extent to which Taskforce Argos’s tactics are at odds with the general standards of that 
jurisdiction. In situations where an agency receiving intelligence was not involved in any way 
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with Taskforce Argos’s operations, it could very well be the case that intelligence could be 
used in good faith to prevent the further victimisation of young people. Conversely, if an 
agency supplies information to Taskforce Argos with the expectation that it will use the 
intelligence to engage in covert action that the original agency would not legally be able to, it 
seems that the concept of good faith should be abandoned given the awareness of officers that 
evidence is being obtained by means that its own judicial system would consider unlawful. 
Though the distinction between these two scenarios appears relatively minor, the clear 
intentions of out-sourcing an illegal operation are categorically evident in the latter context and 
sets it apart from a good faith pursuit of justice. 
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